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What powers are not 
 
Elina Pechlivanidi & Stathis Psillos 
 
Abstract This paper analyses and criticizes the idea that powers are representable as vectors. Mum-
ford and Anjum have recently developed a vector model of powers as part of their account of dispo-
sitional causation. The purpose of this model is to represent dispositionality, i.e. a sui generis type 
of modality introduced by their power-based ontology, as well as to explain various features of their 
account of causation. In this paper, we criticise both the claim that powers are vectors and the con-
comitant claim that the composition of causes can be understood as vector addition. We argue that 
powers cannot be thought of as even analogous to vectors, and that the vector model is simply mis-
leading. We show that the root of the problem is in Mumford and Anjum’s thought that powers 
have magnitude and direction. 
 




Power is an ontological category introduced by Aristotle to explain and ground change and activi-
ty in nature. It was heavily challenged from the seventeenth century on, but has regained populari-
ty since the last quarter of the twentieth century. ‘Power’ is not quite defined. But its key feature, 
at least according to Aristotle and most of his followers, is that a power can exist unmanifested 
though it can be manifested under certain circumstances. Within the current neo-Aristotelian on-
tology, causation is widely taken to be the exercising of powers; it is the production of an effect 
(manifestation) from its dispositional cause(s).  
In their recent work (2011a), Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum (henceforth M&A) 
have aimed to articulate a power-based theory of causation, putting emphasis on the novel modal 
category of dispositionality. Part of this theory is that powers are represented as vectors (2011a, 
2011b). They maintain that the vectorial representation captures key features of powers and that it 
is an indispensable tool for their theory of dispositional causation. Furthermore, they claim that 
this model plays a heuristic role. Traditionally, powers were taken to operate with metaphysical 
necessity: causes were conceived as necessarily related to their effects. But M&A take powers to 
possess an irreducible, sui generis, modality: dispositionality. For them, powers dispose towards 
their manifestation without necessitating it. This view, which is central to their theory, is claimed 
to be brought out by the heuristic role of the powers-as-vectors model; this model is supposed to 
show how causal production does not occur via necessitation; given that causal production is not a 
contingent matter either, the powers-as-vectors model is taken to favour dispositionality (2011a, 
46).  
In this paper we challenge the very idea of the vectorial representation of powers. We begin 
with the strong claim that powers are vectors and we refute it. We then show that even if we were 
to accept an increasingly looser association of powers with vectors, it would still be the wrong 
way to go. Either as constitutive of powers or as a metaphor for the composition of causes, vec-
tors fail to represent causes even at a qualitative level. Finally, we claim that even the simple idea 
of directedness fails. We contend that, in the end, dispositionality does not emerge from the M&A 
model as, when understood in terms of directedness, it becomes poorly supported and highly con-
troversial. 
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2. The representation of powers as vectors 
The motivation for choosing vectors as a tool for the representation of powers arises from pandis-
positionalism: the view that all properties are essentially powers, that is that they are individuated 
by their causal role. On this view, powers are the drivers of change and the grounds of the (new 
category of) dispositional modality, independently of the level at which they operate.1 Hence, 
when a certain effect is produced, this occurs by virtue of the manifestation of some powers. The 
production of an effect depends on the way various powers work with each other (and sometimes 
against each other). Having said this, causal production does not involve necessitation. Rather, it is 
readily admitted that a power-based cause is not a sufficient condition for its effect (hence, it does 
not necessitate its effect), since it is always possible that some counteracting power may interfere 
in a given causal situation so that the characteristic effect does not follow (2011a, chapter 3). This 
is a novelty of their view: causation is neither contingent nor necessary. As they put it: 
 
Causes can be thwarted, for instance, and this should show that they never guarantee their effects, even 
when they succeed in producing them. Causal production should not, therefore, be conflated with causal 
necessitation. (2011a, viii) 
 
The view of causation they favour is dispositional. Causes dispose towards their effects: 
 
Causation involves what we call a dispositional modality. Causes dispose towards their effects, where 
disposing towards something involves an irreducible sui generis modality. The modality is something be-
tween pure contingency and pure necessity and is irreducible to neither. (2011a, viii) 
 
The combination of the thoughts that causation involves various interacting powers, and that a 
cause is something that disposes (and no more than disposes) towards its effect, constitute the ra-
tionale for the main representational scheme that M&A promote: that powers are vectors. Moreo-
ver, powers are thought of, albeit implicitly, as forces. Though this idea is not directly used in the 
construction of their model, it is implied by their view that a power ‘pushes’ towards an effect; a 
view which is meant to replace the traditional idea that powers are active or passive.2 
Vectors are used by M&A to represent the individual acting powers that operate in a given 
causal situation that push (in a certain sense jointly) towards an effect. They are meant to capture 
two key features of powers, i.e. direction and intensity. As M&A put it:  
 
[A] power will have a direction — that towards which it is disposed — such as fragility being a disposi-
tion towards breaking. And it has intensity. A power can be more or less disposed towards an outcome, 
… [as in] the case of fragility, a wine glass will be more fragile than a car windscreen. (2011a, 24) 
 
To thwart an initial objection, we should stress that M&A take the vector-model utterly seriously 
as the way to represent power-based causation. Hence it is not a merely useful metaphor. They 
take it to be licensed by their realist view about powers and, thus, they claim that ‘a realist about 
powers should prefer this way of representing causation’ (2011a, 20). Prima facie, there is a basis 
for the model: powers are said to be ‘directed’ towards their effects and vectors have a direction; 
powers seem to come in degrees of strength (intensity) and vectors have magnitude.   
                                                
1 M&A typically focus on powers and qualities that operate at a macro-level. Though they do acknowledge that the 
use of certain macro-properties (such as ‘being cold’ and ‘being hot’) does not agree with the way science treats the 
relevant properties, they take it for granted that all properties are clusters of powers and thus that at the macro-level 
too, insofar as objects are engaged in causal relations, there are powers that ground causal relations among them. 
2 M&A use the notions of power and disposition interchangeably and, although we are in favour of a distinction be-
tween the two, it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss this issue. 
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Though we shall argue that these similarities are, ultimately, misleading and wrong, it should 
be noted that they are the chief motivations for M&A to introduce the idea that vectors are apt for 
representing powers. By representing powers as vectors, they claim that not only can they capture 
the idea of a power disposing towards a certain outcome, but also the fact that different powers 
can have different dispositional intensities regarding an outcome. In the example in the quotation 
above, while both objects are disposed towards breaking, the wine glass is said to instantiate the 
disposition of breaking in a higher intensity (it is more disposed towards breaking) than the car 
windscreen. According to M&A, then, were we to represent vectorially the fragility of the wine 
glass in comparison to the fragility of the car windscreen, the two vectors would have the same 
direction, as both objects are disposed towards breaking, but they would differ in their length, rep-
resenting the difference in the intensity of the two powers —with the intensity of the disposition of 
the wine glass being represented by a longer directed arrow. 
How is this idea developed by M&A? How are the vectors plotted? M&A intend to construct 
models of single causal situations, e.g., the cooling or the heating of a room, or the breaking of a 
vase. They then define the space that the vectors (the various powers of certain direction and in-
tensity) act upon. Given that they take it that causation involves, most of the times, changes in 
qualities, they find Lawrence Lombard’s quality space to be suitable for playing the role of the 
basis of the vector space in their model. According to Lombard, the quality space is a set S of sim-
ple static properties {P0, P1,…, Pn} meeting two conditions: first, it consists of mutually exclusive 
static properties;3 second, ‘quality spaces are kinds of properties that are such that, if any object 
changes by losing a property belonging to a given quality space, it must come to have another 
property of the same kind’ (1986, 113). Trying to see how this definition can be applied by M&A, 
let us think of a set whose members are two simple and static properties: being red (R), and being 
blue (B). Is {R, B} a quality space? Something cannot be both red and blue throughout and at the 
same time. This satisfies the first condition of Lombard’s definition. Note, however, that {R, B} 
does not satisfy the second condition: although both R and B are properties of the same kind (be-
ing both colours), when something ceases to be red, it does not necessarily become blue. In order 
to conform to both conditions, the quality space S for the kind ‘colour’ should be expressed in the 
following way: S = {x: x is a colour}, where each colour is a simple and static property, and when 
something ceases to be one colour it must become another. In the examples they provide, M&A 
have not defined the quality space in this strict way, but by using pairs of contradictories, such as 
‘hot’ (the quality of being hot) and ‘cold’ (the quality of being cold). Every pair of contradictories 
sets up a one-dimensional quality space for the model, with the two qualities representing the two 
extreme states that is (metaphysically) possible for a given causal situation. Comparing this to the 
requirement of Lombard’s definition, M&A (2011a, 23) do acknowledge that a one-dimension 
quality space is actually a spectrum of qualities, meaning that every point between the two ex-
treme qualities represents a different quality of the same kind. However, using a pair of contradic-
tories enables M&A to pictorially represent the quality space in a simple way, without the need to 
specify how fine-grained the quality space is.  
To apply the model to a causal situation, one must also determine the initial state and the rele-
vant powers that operate at that time. To fix our ideas, here is an example of a ‘causal situation’:  
 
[S]uppose you ingest calcium, which disposes towards bodily health in a number of respects, such as 
good bones, teeth and muscles. Let us represent this as a vector towards F, where F stands for bodily 
health and G stands for ill health. At the same time, however, you may be subject to a number of factors 
                                                
3 As Lombard (1986, 113) says: ‘Static properties that objects can have and then lack [..] divide into kinds in accord-
ance with the following intuitive principle: P and Q belong to the same kind just in case they are contraries and it 
makes good sense to suppose that a thing having P comes to have Q’. 
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that dispose away from health. You could be tired, stressed, have drunk too much coffee, experienced 
passive smoking, and so on. (2011a, 27) 
 
This is a one-dimensional quality space with two qualities, F (good health) and G (ill health), and 
various powers in action. In this ‘causal situation’, the thought is that, given all the operative pow-
ers, there is a dominant disposition towards one of the qualities of the quality space. It is assumed 
that there is a starting point from which causation will operate, which is represented by a vertical 
line drawn at the point within the quality space which captures the current state of the causal situa-
tion (e.g., the exact current state of one’s health). On the line, the active vectors are plotted having 
their directions towards the quality (F or G) they dispose. Note, incidentally, that this presupposes 
that each operative power disposes towards one and exactly one quality in the quality-space. This 
is clearly an unjustified assumption; diet, for instance, can dispose towards both good and bad 
health. But this is an objection that we discuss later; for now, let’s take the disposition towards a 
single quality as an idealization of the model. 
Taking a cue from John Stuart Mill’s (1882) account of the total cause, M&A take the (total) 
disposing cause to be the ‘sum’ of the acting powers. Given that they take causes to be complex, 
consisting in many different powers that can work with or against each other, they claim that the 
way to understand this ‘sum’ of powers is via vector addition.  
The use of vector addition underlines the contrast between pandispositionalism and the tradi-
tional view about dispositional causation. Traditionally powers are taken to require a stimulus and 
some background conditions to manifest themselves. But on pandispositionalism, stimuli must 
themselves be powerful and this is, at least prima facie, in favour of the M&A project: being real-
ist about powers they do not hold a distinction between the single power that becomes manifested 
and the rest of the conditions that enabled it to do so. As they put it: 
 
Metaphysically, we should judge them [the powers] on a par to the extent that they all contribute. A dis-
tinction between causes and background conditions cannot have any real ontological strength because the 
effect is not triggered until they are all present, which can in any case be a momentary matter. […] The 
distinction between causes and background conditions is not an ontologically grounded one, but rather a 
pragmatic or epistemological one. (2011a, 32-33) 
 
Thus, instead of passive powers being stimulated, C. B. Martin’s (2008) idea of mutual manifesta-
tion partners looks more conducive to the M&A view.4 Under this understanding, the total cause 
consists in multiple powers working together. M&A argue that the model has the advantage of 
presenting the composition of the causes for each individual causal situation: the cause is captured 
by the resultant vector R, as the outcome of vector addition.  
Vector addition is taken as the tour de force of the M&A model. According to them, the vec-
torial character of powers reveals that they convey only a tendency towards an effect; the vector of 
the resultant power R captures the dispositional modality of power-based causation. More specifi-
cally, the point within the quality space that coincides with the end-point of the resultant vector 
represents the disposition that the certain causal situation has the tendency to manifest. It does not 
represent what will or must happen given the specific component powers; it only represents what 
is disposed to happen (2011a, 175).  
On the traditional view of powers, there are two possible states: the state of an unmanifested 
power, and the manifestation of this power. A power is not (necessarily) preserved after it is mani-
fested. A glass is fragile, and when the fragility of the glass is manifested, the glass breaks and the 
                                                
4 Martin says: ‘I have been talking as if a disposition exists unmanifested until a set of background conditions is met, 
resulting in manifestation. This picture is misleading […] A more accurate view is one of a huge group of disposition 
entities or properties which, when they come together, mutually manifest the property in question; talk of background 
condition ceases, replaced by talk of power nets’ (2008, 50). 
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power ceases to exist. On the M&A view, things look different. The component powers compose 
into the (resultant) dispositional cause. However, the ontological commitment to both the compo-
nent powers and the resultant power raises the following question: if every power is associated 
with a certain manifestation, should the effect be explained in terms of the multiple manifestations 
of the component powers, or as the outcome of the resultant power? The M&A model seems 
committed to the latter view since it introduces the resultant power to represent the total disposi-
tion of the causal situation. Moreover, were powers to be considered as vectors, Nancy Cart-
wright’s criticism of realism concerning the component forces and the metaphor of the vector ad-
dition seems plausible. As Cartwright has argued: ‘The vector addition story is […] a nice one. 
But it is just a metaphor. We add forces (or the numbers that represent forces) when we do calcula-
tions. Nature does not ‘add’ forces. For the ‘component’ forces are not there, in any metaphysical 
sense, to be added…’ (1983, 59). The pandispositionalist account of M&A is meant to deny this. It 
takes it that component powers are as real as the resultant power. To give an account of their own 
view, M&A claim that the situation is analogous to the statue and the clay case, so both the com-
ponent and the resultant powers exist as not entirely distinct existences, nor in a part-whole way; 
rather they stand in a composition relation. 
Be that as it may, there is another issue in the offing. According to the M&A model, the com-
ponent vectors represent the exercising powers that act in the specific causal situation; yet, the re-
sultant power is an unmanifested power, since the resultant vector represents nothing more than a 
tendency (disposition) towards an effect (2001a, 175). This way to view things creates a conun-
drum. If the component powers are operating, i.e. if they are doing their work, how is it possible 
for the resultant power to be unmanifested? What more does it need in order that it becomes mani-
fested than the manifestation of the component powers? To resolve this conundrum, we should 
either assume that the resultant power is a new (emergent) power which needs the addition of an-
other manifestation partner for it to become manifested; or we should assume that the activation of 
powers does not consist in their manifestation. If we follow the first horn, we are in need of an ac-
count of the supposed additional power that is needed, since it seems clear that all the powers nec-
essary for the effect are already present. If the fragility and the striking of a vase (being the com-
ponent powers) are manifested, then what is the new resultant power? And why isn’t it manifest-
ed? If we follow the second horn, it seems we are committed to the implausible claim that alt-
hough a power is operative or activated, it can still exist unmanifested. 
Let’s leave all this to the one side and focus on the main idea, viz., that powers can be repre-
sented vectorially. In the sequel, we pose two questions concerning the vectorial representation of 
powers, both of which are answered negatively:  
− Are powers vectors?  
− Can they be usefully viewed as in some sense analogous to vectors?  
 
3. Powers are not vectors 
In his Process and Reality, A.N. Whitehead put forward the claim that all things are vectors 
(1929, 309). At the final stage of the presentation of the vector model, M&A reflected on this 
claim and noted: 
 
What exactly Whitehead meant by this, we may never know. His work defies simple and unequivocal in-
terpretation. But we have offered a model for causation in which Whitehead’s statement would make some 
sense. All things have properties and all properties are powers, for the pandispositionalist. If such powers 
are understood as directed towards a manifestation, with a degree or intensity, then all things become vec-
tors or at least they can be represented as such. (2011a, 45-46)  
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This may well justify us in attributing to them the strong clam that powers are vectors.  
 
3.1 Power-vectors are not vectors 
Geometrically, a vector can be represented as a directed line segment with an arrow indicating the 
direction and whose length is the magnitude of the vector. In physics, vectors have been used for 
representing forces. Forces have magnitude and direction, and they add vectorially. In the M&A 
model vectors are used to represent the exercising powers that operate upon the quality space 
(2011a 24). But are powers vectors? Do they, too, add vectorially?  
For something to be a vector it is not enough that it has a direction and a magnitude. A mov-
ing car has both but it is not a vector. Mathematically, vectors are defined in vector spaces. Let 𝑉 
be a set on which two operations are defined: (1) vector addition, which combines two elements of 𝑉 and is denoted by “+”, and (2) scalar multiplication, which combines a complex number with an 
element of 𝑉 and is denoted by juxtaposition. 𝑉, together with the two operations, is a vector 
space over the set of complex numbers ℂ if the following properties hold.5 
 
Additive Closure of Vector Addition If 𝒖,𝒗 ∈ 𝑉, then 𝒖 + 𝒗 ∈ 𝑉. 
Scalar Closure of Vector Addition If 𝛼 ∈ ℂ and 𝒖 ∈ 𝑉, then 𝛼𝒖 ∈ 𝑉. 
Commutativity of Vector Addition If 𝒖,𝒗 ∈ 𝑉, then 𝒖 + 𝒗 = 𝒗 + 𝒖. 
Associativity of Vector Addition If 𝒖,𝒗,𝒘 ∈ 𝑉, then 𝒖 + 𝒗 + 𝒘 = 𝒖 + 𝒗 + 𝒘. 
Additive Identity There is a zero vector,𝟎, such that 𝒖 + 𝟎 = 𝒖, for all 𝒖 ∈ 𝑉. 
Additive Inverses If 𝒖 ∈ 𝑉, then there exists a vector,−𝒖 ∈ 𝑉, so that 𝒖 + (−𝒖) = 𝟎. 
Distributivity across Vector Addition If 𝛼 ∈ ℂ and 𝒖,𝒗 ∈ 𝑉, then 𝛼(𝒖 + 𝒗) = 𝛼𝒖 + 𝛼𝒗. 
Scalar Multiplication Associativity If 𝛼,𝛽 ∈ ℂ and 𝒖 ∈ 𝑉, then 𝛼(𝛽𝒖) = (𝛼𝛽)𝒖. 
Identity Element of Scalar Multiplication If 𝒖 ∈ 𝑉, then 1𝒖 = 𝒖. 
Distributivity across Scalar Addition If 𝛼,𝛽 ∈ ℂ and 𝒖 ∈ 𝑉, then (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝒖 = 𝛼𝒖 + 𝛽𝒖. 
 
Something, then, is a vector by being a member of a vector space 𝑉.  
The properties expressed above implicitly define vector addition and scalar multiplication.  
The norm or length of a vector is an important type of function that can be defined on a vector 
space. It is a function satisfying the following: 
                                                
5 Bold letters denote vectors and Greek italic letters denote scalars. 
 7 
 
1. 𝒖 > 0,when 𝒖 ≠ 𝟎 and 𝒖 = 0 iff 𝒖 = 𝟎. 
2. 𝛼𝒖 =  𝛼 𝒖 , for any scalar 𝑎 
3. 𝒖 + 𝒗 ≤ 𝒖 + 𝒗  
 
A basis for a vector space is a linearly independent set of vectors, such that any vector in the space 
can be written as a linear combination of the elements of this set. In most problems in physics and 
mathematics, the choice of an appropriate coordinate system provides great computational ad-
vantages. In the case of the usual two- and three-dimensional vectors, it is typical to represent an 
arbitrary vector as a sum of unit vectors, where the unit vector has the same direction as the given 
(nonzero) vector 𝒖.  
A two-dimensional vector 𝒖 whose initial point is at the origin (0, 0), can be uniquely repre-
sented by the coordinates of its terminal point (𝑢!,𝑢!). This is the component form of a vector u, 
expressed as 𝒖 =< 𝑢!,𝑢! >, where 𝑢! and 𝑢! are the components of u. The component form of 
the vector with initial co-ordinates 𝑃 = (𝑝!,𝑝!)  and terminal co-ordinates Q = (𝑞!, 𝑞!)  is 𝒖 =< 𝑞! − 𝑝!, 𝑞! − 𝑝! >=< 𝑢!,𝑢! >. Finally, the magnitude of 𝒖 is given by the following ex-
pression:  
 𝒖 = (𝑞! − 𝑝!)! + (𝑞! − 𝑝!)! = 𝑢!! + 𝑢!!. 
 
From this description of a vector-space it seems obvious that powers qua vectors (from now on: 
power-vectors) are nothing like vectors in vector spaces. Quality spaces, where power-vectors 
live, are not vector spaces. And since vectors can exist only in vector spaces, powers are not vec-
tors.  
But could it be that power-vectors exist in a vector space? After presenting the idea of powers 
having vectorial features, M&A claim that:  
 
At this point, we are thus able to make use of another notion that comes from vectors as used in physics, 
namely, vector addition. Powers can combine with additive, and sometimes subtractive, effects […]. 
When they do so, they may overall dispose in one direction or the other. […] Vector addition, in any 
case, can proceed in a rough-and-ready way without having to add and subtract the numbers [these that 
correspond to the intensity of the power-vectors]. We can perform a simple analogical addition by plac-
ing the tail of one vector on the head of another. (2011a, 28)  
 
To perform a vector addition as described here, it is required that powers satisfy the associativity 
and the commutativity of vector addition. Is adding power a to power b the same as adding b to 
a? Or is it the same for power a to be added to powers b and c, as with power c to be added to 
powers a and b? It seems that powers do not consistently obey the properties of vector addition. 
The order by means of which two or more powers combine may lead to different manifestations. 
M&A are silent on this matter. But let us assume that power-vector addition does satisfy the two 
foregoing laws. How much of the vector theory does the power-vector model take? It’s by no 
means clear. To be sure, the M&A model also includes the zero vector. As they put it:  
 
There is a special case of vector addition that is very important to distinguish. This is a case where the 
dispositions towards F and the dispositions towards G balance out perfectly, such that the resultant vector 
is neither directed towards F nor towards G. Where we have perfectly counterbalancing dispositions in 
this way, we say that we have a zero resultant vector. (2011a, 29)  
 
But no further information is given as to which of the listed properties of vector spaces are satis-
fied by the power-vector addition. This should be enough to show that power-vector addition is 
not really vector-addition. And in any case, it should be by now clear that if power-vectors are 
vectors, they should be characterised by more than ‘direction’ and ‘magnitude’.  
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To a large extend M&A focus their attention on one-dimensional quality spaces, which makes 
vector addition easier. This already creates a problem since it requires that every kind of quality 
creates a single dimension. Given a model of a one-dimensional quality space, the power-vectors 
that operate in it can be seen as being necessarily one-dimensional (see Fig.1). One-dimensional 
power-vectors are not ‘free vectors’; they are supposed to be represented by localized line seg-
ments, the origin of which is a point in the quality space. For instance, M&A say:  
 
If we are trying to represent a causal situation with respect to, for instance, the temperature of someone’s 
hand, then the vertical line represents the temperature of the hand at the starting point such that it could 






  Fig. 1  
A one-dimensional vector model of two powers at 
work and their addition, according to Mumford 
and Anjum. 
 
Here is a crucial question: what are the identity-conditions of power-vectors? When it comes 
to vectors, things are straightforward. Two vectors are equal if and only if they have the same di-
rection and magnitude. Besides, any vector can be translated to the single vector that has the same 
direction and magnitude and its starting point is located at the origin of the coordinate system. 
Take velocities (or any other vectorial quantities). We can certainly tell when two velocities are 
the same by saying that they have the same direction and magnitude (that is, they are the same 
vectors—in a given vector space). But that’s exactly what we cannot do with powers: we cannot 
simply tell that two powers are the same iff they have the same direction and magnitude. Hence, 
the whole aim of using power-vectors qua vectors to identify powers collapses.  
To see this, let us suppose that we stipulate that the origin of the ‘coordinate system’ of the 
model is the point of the initial state (whichever that is) of the causal situation. Assume that a 
power-vector a (the ‘power-vector’ representing a power to heat the hand, let’s say) has the same 
direction and magnitude with another power-vector a΄. Assume, also, that a΄ corresponds to a dif-
ferent power, viz., one disposed to yield a different quality (e.g., the power of the hand to be 
                                                
6 Let’s forget, for the time being, that temperature is scalar; or that energy—which actually gets transferred between the hand and 
the environment—is a scalar quantity. Let’s play along and assume a heating power (whatever that is!) which is vectorial (qua 
power). 
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warmed up). Though if a and a΄ were vectors they would have to be equal, qua power-vectors, 
they are different since they represent different powers.  
Conversely, let us assume that there are more than one powers that are directed towards one 
and the same quality F (e.g., towards raising the temperature of the hand). Assume also that some 
of them at least have the same ‘intensity’ —and hence that they are represented as having the same 
magnitude. They would all be plotted on the point of origin. But there is no fact of the matter as to 
what the ‘direction’ of each power is and how it should be plotted in the quality space. One power-
vector a might have direction 𝛼 and another power-vector a΄ might have direction 𝛼΄. Qua power-
vectors all these would be equal, since the represent the same power towards F. But they are repre-
sented by different vectors, since they have different directions. Should the objection be that pow-
ers directed towards the same quality have the same direction, the reply would be that this is not 
obviously so. It is possible for one and the same power to be represented by different power-
vectors of the opposite direction and of different magnitude.7 
Hence, distinct power-vectors can represent the same power. And conversely, distinct powers 
can be represented by the same power-vector. So if powers are power-vectors, we cannot tell, in 
principle, when two powers are the same or not.  
There is more to be said against the power-vector model. For instance, there is no stipulation 
of a coordinate system. Could it be argued that such a system is implied, as it were, on the basis of 
a given initial point within the quality space, and the postulation of different dimensions as corre-
sponding to different quality kinds? Even if this suggestion could be defended (as we are about to 
see, there are no unit vectors; nor a basis), it could only work with single-dimensional spaces and 
power-vectors. Yet, apart from the detailed cases of power-vectors that operate within a one-
dimensional model, M&A talk about circumstances that more than one kind of quality can be af-
fected by a collection of acting powers, suggesting that their model can be expanded to having 
more than one quality-dimensions. This is an example (originated in Geach 1962, 102) that M&A 
presented as a way to prompt the idea that powers interact with each other in multiple dimensions: 
 
[A] room contains both a heater and a cooling air conditioner. We will make the case two-dimensional. 
The heater can, let us say, warm the room to 25oC within an hour with dry air. The air conditioner can 
cool the room temperature to 10oC within an hour with slightly damp air. Suppose both the heater and the 
cooler are left on and the powers along the hot-cold and dry-damp dimensions are inseparable. We can 
still, nevertheless, understand such complex powers along the lines of vectors, and understand their com-
bined effect along the lines of vector addition. (2011a, 44) 
 
This example motivates a version of the model that consists in positioning two pairs of extremes 
in what seems to be a perpendicular position relative to each other, while the initial point is now a 
single dot on the two-dimensional vector space, on which the power-vectors of the ‘power to 
warm’ and of the ‘power to cool’ are plotted on a certain angle to each other.  
 
 
                                                
7 An example we discuss later regards fragility. One can refer to fragility as ‘the power of something to break easily when it is 
knocked’, or as ‘the power of having low resistance to a knock’. Both descriptions refer to the same quality of a fragile thing; how-
ever, were this quality to be represented as a power-vector, this can be done on the basis of either these descriptions, i.e. as a pow-
er-vector of large magnitude representing the ‘easily-breaking’ behaviour, or as a power-vector of small magnitude representing the 





Vectors within a two-dimensional quality space, according 
to Mumford and Anjum. 
 
This set up generates many questions about the way it is constructed. For instance, how are the 
exact positions, directions, and magnitudes of the power-vectors to be specified? But, assuming it 
for now, it is hard to see how any system of co-ordinates can be associated with it. And given that 
a model such as this, if it is to be realistic at all, should allow for a number of dimensions (pairs of 
extreme qualities), it makes no sense whatsoever to have a formula for ‘calculating’ the resultant 
power-vector. It makes no sense to ask what is the component form of the vector or its norm. In 
fact, we think there is no fact of the matter. Because, for all we know there is no reason to think 
that there is a correct way to describe the operation of two powers as being additive. Why, for in-
stance, not to think of the interaction between powers as being represented by the external product 
of the vectors?  
Without a well-defined coordinate system, it is impossible to locate any power-vector in a 
multi-dimensional quality space, because no exact angle of a power-vector can be determined. 
Furthermore, while any vector that forms an angle relative to the axes of its coordinate system can 
be analysed into component vectors that are parallel to the basis vectors, such a notion is non-
existent in the power-vector model. Within a coordinate system, the basis vectors have another 
role too: they provide the unit upon which a scalar multiplication of the vectors parallel to them 
can operate. Such a unit is absent from the power-vector model. But even if such a unit were pro-
vided, there is another matter to be reckoned with: taking into account that the different dimen-
sions of the M&A model represent kinds of qualities (e.g. temperature, humidity etc.) that are 
measured in different ‘units’, how meaningful would it be for a power-vector to be located in the 
‘unification’ of two, or more, incompatible quality-dimensions? What sense does it make for vec-
tors operating in different dimensions to be added?  
Hence, a multi-dimensional model for power-vectors is impossible on the basis of i) the im-
possibility of a well-defined coordinate system, ii) the absence of basis vectors and measuring 
units, and iii) the incompatibility of the various dimensions regarding measuring units of the quali-
ties involved.  
It should, therefore, be obvious that the power-vector model for causal powers cannot be a 
vector space. Powers are not vectors. To sum up, we don’t know how to understand power-vector 
addition; we have no clue as to whether any of the properties of vector spaces are satisfied; we 
have no way to define the norm of vectors and no way to specify a unit vector. These are all tech-
nical limitations that the power-vector model faces. But the technical limitations are the conse-
quence of a fundamental mismatch: powers are not cut out to be vectors after all. What remains, 
then, is to look into the weaker claim that such a representation of powers via power-vectors can 
be grounded on a (weak) analogy between powers and vectors. 
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3.2 Powers are not analogous to vectors 
It might be that the only elements of vectors that are needed for the M&A model to work —for 
purposes of philosophical illustration— are the magnitude and the direction (plus the addition law, 
in some sense). But this weaker view cannot be supported either, as it leads to problematic meta-
physical implications. 
The thought that powers have an intensity is something that a power-theorist could accept. 
After all a substance can be more or less poisonous, more or less soluble, more or less flammable, 
or more or less fragile than another. This indicates that powers admit of degrees: x might be more, 
or less powerful than y to F. Therefore, one might think, something can have a power to F to a cer-
tain intensity or strength.  
Indeed, this seems to be the case with ‘garden-variety’ macro-level powers, which are the 
main examples that M&A use to ground their theory. They do acknowledge that powers at this 
macro-level are collections of more fundamental (micro-)powers. However, their view takes it that 
if causation operates at all levels, so do powers. This focus on macro-level causally potent powers 
commits the power-theorist to properties that are to be found in folk causal explanations, raising 
issues about the credibility that a power-based theory may have when it comes to physics. Refer-
ring, for instance, to the power to warm and the power to cool would clearly not be accepted as 
being scientifically accurate. The ‘cooling’ power and the ‘warming’ power are processes of ener-
gy transfer among objects with different temperatures. And most of the quantities that M&A think 
as vectorially representable powers are scalar. But let’s not dwell more on it and just examine the 
extent to which, if at all, garden-variety powers have ‘magnitude’ and ‘direction’. 
In those cases, where we have an intuition that powers are more or less intense, how are we to 
determine the intensity of a power and represent it by means of length? Accuracy in ascribing the 
magnitude of each power-vector is important for vector addition. Any difference in the length of 
the power-vector entails a difference regarding the ending point of the power-vector within the 
quality space; and hence a difference in intensity. But this, in turn, indicates a different possible 
state that the causal situation can acquire once the manifestation has occurred and, ultimately, a 
different resultant disposition. The requirement of accuracy is, therefore, very crucial for the pur-
poses of the model, if it is to offer anything other than vague, arbitrary and purely qualitative rep-
resentations of the causal situation. But the very idea of a magnitude requires that powers are 
quantifiable; and more specifically, it requires that there is a unit-power. For only the ascription of 
a unit can result in the representation of a power in terms of magnitude. 
Not all powers are quantifiable. Therefore, there is no way to determine the length of the di-
rected segments in the model. While, for instance, we can claim that given the same amount of 
pressure exerted on a glass object and on a similar but ceramic object, the former has the tendency 
to break more (or greater) than the later, there is no certain (or absolute) intensity associated with 
the manifestation of fragility. Something is characterized as fragile because it is more disposed to 
break in comparison to other things, or it is disposed to break to different degrees depending on 
the amount of pressure it will receive. Hence, a power like the fragility of an object is context sen-
sitive, and doubly so. For one thing, it is a comparative power, therefore it needs a contrast-class. 
For another, it can be manifested in different degrees depending on the force that is exerted on the 
surface of the object, even if the intrinsic properties of the object are unchanged. The vector model 
is incapable of capturing this context-sensitivity via the intensity that is ascribed to powers. For 
instance, there is no way to show that the tendency of a glass to break (consequently, the magni-
tude of the corresponding power-vector) varies depending on the magnitude of the pressure that is 
exerted on it. As it has been acknowledged already by D. Manley and R. Wasserman (2007, 70), 
as long as there are dispositional predicates displaying context sensitivity, degrees, and compara-
tive use of powers, a scale for each power is required, ‘along which objects can be compared, and 
by reference to which the context-dependence of dispositional predicates can be explained’. 
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The demand for a unit of measuring the intensity of a power might be taken to be too strong 
by M&A, as they do not require of their model to provide any quantitative results, but to qualita-
tively represent what is disposed to happen in a causal situation. For these purposes, it might seem, 
depicting roughly the intensity of a power would be adequate. After all, they take it that although 
the power-vector model does not introduce any units for measuring the intensity of a power, it still 
succeeds in representing it. It is, however, just a lucky accident that the M&A model seems to 
work for some cases. This happens because the powers being involved in the chosen examples are 
associated with two kinds of qualities: either they are used to capture a change in some scalar 
quantity (e.g. a change in the temperature of the room by 10oC), or to represent something that is 
already a vectorial quantity (e.g. the force that a book exerts on the surface of the table). These are 
exceptional cases. However, the majority of powers cannot be so represented. Most powers are not 
even intuitively comparable. Which arrow should be longer in the model for the combustion of a 
match? Is the power of the flammable material smaller or larger in intensity than the power of the 
oxygen? There is simply no fact of the matter. And how are arrows to be plotted in the case of the 
repulsion between two charges? Or the attraction between two masses? 
Perhaps all that M&A care about is plotting the resultant disposition. But then it is totally ir-
relevant how we plot the ‘intensities’ of the various component powers, provided we get right the 
prevailing intuition about what the dominant disposition is. Furthermore, the power-vector model 
heavily overdetermines the causal situation. Suppose that in a causal situation, all the powers that 
are relevant to the breaking of a vase are acting. If there is a dominant disposition towards the 
manifestation of breaking, the only constraint on picking the ‘intensities’ of the component powers 
is that when they are ‘added’, the ‘resultant’ is pointing towards the breaking side of the quality-
space. The very idea that powers have specific ‘intensities’, whatever that means, is redundant and 
irrelevant. In the end, it is totally clear that the analysis of the dominant disposition of a causal sit-
uation to component powers with certain ‘magnitudes’ is completely arbitrary.  
But if the ‘intensity’ of a power is a misnomer, can we at least make good sense of the direc-
tion of powers? The application of the notion of direction to power-vectors is very problematic. It 
is enough to show that it creates inconsistencies for which any attempt to be resolved is purely ad 
hoc. The core of the problem is in the thought that even if we were to grant that all powers are di-
rected towards their manifestation, this ‘directedness’ can be seen as analogous to the direction of 
a vector.  
One way to see this is by examining the way that the M&A model represents non-acting, that 
is unmanifested, powers. For they too have a tendency towards their manifestation and therefore 
they should be represented as power-vectors in the relevant quality space (even though they are 
not acting). To fix our ideas, let us think of the toy example of an unburned inflammable match. 
Since flammability is a power, it should be represented as a power-vector within the relevant qual-
ity space of the combustion of the specific match. This quality space is one-dimensional and has 
two boundary qualities: not burned (~B) and (say) totally burned (Bt). The initial point of this 
causal situation is on ~B, given that the match is unburned. Suppose that in the environment of the 
match there is no oxygen. Then the only power-vector to be plotted is the flammability-vector di-
rected towards Bt. Even in this isolated situation, following the norms of the model, what is being 
represented is the dominant tendency of the current situation; that is, the tendency of the match to 
become burned just by plotting its (power of) flammability. This example is analogous to other 
dubious powers that are supposed to be directed towards their manifestations, such as that every 
living thing being disposed towards its death, or the sunrise being disposed towards the sunset. 
The possibility of unmanifested powers suggests that an understanding of tendency or disposition-
ality in terms of directedness is problematic.  
M&A themselves have noted the inability of the power-vector model to represent consistently 
unmanifested or single powers. By emphasizing that powers require manifestation partners in or-
der to manifest themselves, their suggested answer is based on the following idea: as long as there 
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is some other power, or powers, whose existence is required for the manifestation of power p to 
occur, if a power p remains unmanifested, this must be because there is an equilibrium that keeps 
it unmanifested. The motivation of this idea is by the following example: 
 
Dynamite … has an explosive disposition which seems to manifest only when it is ignited. Without stim-
ulation, it might be thought, it does nothing. On further inspection, however, we find that dynamite’s ex-
plosive power comes from it being made up in three parts of nitroglycerin, a substance that is so explo-
sive that its disposition has to be counterbalanced by one part diatomaceous earth, which gives it a coun-
tervailing power of stability. … [So], nothing happens in respect of the dynamite’s power of explosive-
ness only because it is counteracted by other hidden powers. When the fuse is lit on a stick of dynamite, 
this is actually the addition of a further power, which then takes the situation out of the equilibrium 
(2011a, 36-37). 
 
For them, cases like the unmanifested power of explosiveness are being misrepresented. These ‘un-
known, hidden, or taken-for-granted’, powers have to be represented in the model as power-vectors 
that have opposite direction and equal magnitude to the unmanifested power (2011a, 36). As a result, 
the powers cancel each other out, their resultant disposition of the causal situation being of zero in-
tensity, thereby allowing—according to M&A—the causal situation to remain unaltered, as if noth-
ing happens. Although they present this as a special case, there is no reason to think that this descrip-
tion does not generalize to all possessed but unmanifested powers. After all, according to pandisposi-
tionalism, the components of (resultant) powers are powers too. Thus, following the picture that is 
sketched here, when a power is unmanifested, the component powers are in an equilibrium state. 
Suppose the fragility (f) of a glass is unmanifested, viz., the glass, though fragile, is not broken (~B). 
The way that M&A describe the situation of the unmanifested power of fragility is the following: 
 
[F]ragility on its own seems to do nothing, but isn’t this only because the fragile object also possesses 
some countervailing stability and elasticity, which holds that object together enough until some knock is 
sustained? (2011a, 37). 
 
Is this plausible at all? On the one hand, it inflates unnecessarily the metaphysics of powers, as it 
leads to the supposition of additional powers to explain (by counteracting to) unmanifested powers. 
On the other hand, it is inconsistent with the setup of the very M&A model. Figure 3 illustrates the 




The equilibrium of unmanifested powers, according to Mumford 
and Anjum. 
 
The power-vector e represents the power of elasticity mentioned in the quotation above, as the one 
that countervails f. The view that powers have directedness even when they are not manifested leads 
to postulating this countervailing power. However, the restriction in what the direction of e should 
be, so as to explain the equilibrium situation, immediately creates a tension between this setup and 
the notion of directedness. For, what is e directed towards? Towards more elasticity? Or towards 
more stability? Does it ‘push’ the glass towards being as much elastic as it is fragile? Then why is the 
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glass characterized as fragile? An object that is characterized as very fragile can be said to be mini-
mally elastic. Then by ‘fragility’ and ‘elasticity’ we seem to denote one and the same power, and it is 
for purely pragmatic reasons that we opt for using one name over the other. Not only does the M&A 
solution to the alleged directedness of unmanifested powers not solve the problem with the notion of 
directedness that it assumes, on the contrary; it actually accentuates it. After all, positing a counter-
acting power-vector e is clearly incompatible with the setup of the power-vector model, as e appears 
to be operating outside the quality space {broken, unbroken} where there is no quality towards which 
to be directed.  
Moreover, if we consider that in every application of the model the resultant power R does not 
differ ontologically from any other power, in a case of equilibrium where the resultant R has zero 
‘intensity’, (it is represented by the ‘zero’ power-vector), this power does not have any direction 
either. Since R does not have either intensity or direction, it does not differ (and hence cannot be 
distinguished) from any other zero-resultant power. 
When causality occurs, it does by means of what is described as ‘the resultant power’. Thus, 
given the epistemic inaccessibility to the component powers, one can only intuitively determine 
the direction of each component power. Maybe in some cases, ‘fixing’ the direction of the con-
tributing powers is more straightforward than others. However, in examples where the directed-
ness is context-dependent, one power can have different directions: while an amount of serum co-
balamin (vitamin B12) has the power to treat vitamin B12-deficiency, disposing towards better 
health, in different circumstances the same amount of vitamin B12 has the power to raise the se-
rum cobalamin levels so high that there are pathological consequences —thereby disposing to-
wards deteriorating health. This example shows that whereas a component power has some direct-
edness towards a certain manifestation, in this case the power towards raising the levels of serum 
cobalamin, in different contexts the very same power has to be represented as having different di-
rection. Consequently, it is wrong to associate the dispositional character of powers with the view 
that powers have any particular direction. 
The root of the problem, it seems to us, is that the sense in which the power is ‘directed to its 
effect’ is, at best, metaphorical. A vector is directed quantity; this means it has a direction. It does 
not mean it is directed towards anything. To find the direction of a vector quantity, e.g. velocity, 
we need to plot a graph in which the direction is fully specified by the angle of the vector relative 
to the co-ordinates. In fact, a vector can also be regarded as the set of all directed line-segments 
that are equivalent to a given directed line segment. There is no sense of semblance here between 
the ‘directedness’ of powers and the direction of vectors. But even as a metaphor, the idea that 
powers are directed towards their effects is misleading. While in the M&A model the power-
vector is ‘directed’ towards an existing point in the quality space, powers have only the tendency 
towards the change of the state that their manifestation would yield. There is no existing point to-
wards which they are directed.  
4. Conclusion 
The idea behind representing powers as vectors is that vectors can capture the key features of dis-
positional causes: directedness and intensity. As we have shown, the power-vectors in the M&A 
model are not vectors. In fact, we have shown that powers cannot be vectors. The idea is physical-
ly wrong and metaphysically confusing. If metaphysical views are to be consonant with current 
physical theories, then powers —whatever their merits— cannot be modeled as vectors. But then 
we asked: could it be that there is some sense in which powers are analogous to vectors, even if 
strictly speaking they are not vectors? We have shown that the analogy is misconceived. The no-
tions of magnitude and directedness of power-vectors are problematic and incompatible with the 
idea that vector-powers operate within a quality space via vector addition. Powers cannot even be 
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loosely analogous to vectors by means of their alleged intensity and directedness. It is, then, safe 
to conclude that the vectorial representation of powers is misleading and cannot cast any light on 
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